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ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the trial court err by allowing a debt buyer to prove its case against a  
debtor by submitting unauthenticated documents and an affidavit of an individual 
not employed by the original creditor given that Rule 3-306 provides that a debt 
buyer must prove its case with evidence that would pass muster under the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule? 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici2 are national and local consumer advocacy organizations, each having 
extensive experience representing the interests of low income consumers in state 
and federal courts to protect them from the injustice of erroneous judgments 
entered against them in debt buyer lawsuits. Although the amount in controversy is 
typically small, averaging about $3,000, the consequences of an erroneous 
judgment can be devastating.  
Amici have an interest in protecting people from abusive debt collection 
based on inherently inaccurate and unverified information. Several have 
                                     
2 Pursuant to Rule 8-511(b), amici curiae certifies that the statements expressed in 
this brief represent the considered opinion of the  amici in its capacity as advocates 
of low-income and older people. Amici have authored this brief in its entirety and 
have no interest in the outcome of the particular litigation between Appellants and 
Appellees except the institutional interests described within. No persons or entities 
have made any monetary or other contribution to the preparation or submission of 
this brief other than amici, their members, and counsel. 
2 
 
participated as amici curiae in cases involving challenges to abusive debt 
collections in federal and state courts. Amici have also advocated for improved 
court procedures—including in Maryland—and regulatory oversight of the debt 
buyer industry. Amici are engaged in the public policy debate over the standards of 
proof and rules of evidence and the due process rights which arise in the context of 
debt buyer litigation. Specifically, amici seek to combat errors and injustice in the 
context of debt collection—especially debt buyer—lawsuits. Amici raise issues 
which might otherwise escape the Court’s attention, and amici’s participation in 
this case will assist this Court in understanding and evaluating the issues raised on 
appeal. 
AARP is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization with a membership that helps 
people turn their goals and dreams into real possibilities, strengthens communities 
and fights for the issues that matter most to families such as healthcare, 
employment and income security, retirement planning, affordable utilities and 
protection from financial abuse. As the leading organization representing the 
interests of people aged fifty and older, AARP is greatly concerned about abusive 
practices being used to collect stale and invalid debt, to which older people are 
especially vulnerable. Many older debtors believe they will go to jail if summoned 
to court. Older people are more easily upset by the threat of a court judgment 
against them, and many believe that they will lose their homes, pensions, or bank 
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accounts, or even go to jail if they receive a court summons. As a result, older 
people may feel coerced into paying debts they had already paid in full or never 
owed in the first place, such as debts of a deceased loved one.  
The University of Maryland Law School Consumer Protection Clinic 
provides pro bono representation to Maryland consumers who are being sued by 
debt buyers. In addition to representing individual clients, the Clinic is also tasked 
with public outreach and education. In these capacities, the Clinic seeks to identify 
and propose solutions to systemic problems which impede access to justice for 
Maryland’s residents, particularly its self represented litigants.  In partnership with 
the Maryland Pro Bono Resource Center’s Consumer Protection Project, the Clinic  
also provides consultation and support to pro bono lawyers who are part of 
PBRC’s Consumer Protection Project. 
Civil Justice, Inc. (“CJ”) is a non-profit, public interest organization 
founded in 1998 for the purpose of increasing the delivery of legal services to 
individuals of low and moderate income while supporting a statewide network of 
solo, small firm and community based lawyers who share a commitment to 
increasing access to justice. CJ has represented hundreds of Maryland consumers 
individually, and thousands in public interest litigation who have been victimized 
by predatory creditors and their affiliates.  CJ and its members routinely advise and 
often represent Maryland consumers who are facing debt collection actions in state 
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courts, many of whom are pro se, and clarifying the rules of procedure and proof 
required will have a significant impact in these cases. 
Maryland Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. provides direct legal services to low-
income consumers in support of its mission to safeguard the economic stability of 
the State’s poorest residents by ensuring that only valid debts are being lawfully 
collected in the courts of this State. Over the past ten years, that stability has been 
threatened by the massive increase in lawsuits filed by debt buyers. Because so 
many more people seek Legal Aid’s help each year than it can possibly represent, 
many eligible individuals are turned away. The Legal Aid Bureau must usually 
provide only brief advice and close cases involving consumers sued for old credit 
card debts on the District Court’s small claim docket. 
The National Association of Consumer Advocates (“NACA”) is a non-
profit corporation whose members are private and public sector attorneys, legal 
services attorneys, law professors and law students whose primary focus involves 
the protection and representation of consumers. NACA’s mission is to promote 
justice for all consumers by maintaining a forum for information sharing among 
consumer advocates across the country and serving as a voice for its members as 
well as consumers in the ongoing effort to curb unfair and abusive business 
practices. Enforcement and compliance with consumer protection laws has been a  
continuing concern of NACA since its inception. 
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The National Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”) is a national research and 
advocacy organization focusing on justice in consumer financial transactions, 
especially for low income and elderly consumers. Since its founding as a non-
profit corporation in 1969 at Boston College School of Law, NCLC has been the  
consumer law resource center to which legal services and private lawyers, state and 
federal consumer protection officials, public policy makers, consumer and business 
reporters, and consumer and low-income community organizations across the 
nation have turned for legal answers, policy analysis, and technical and legal 
support. NCLC is recognized nationally as an expert in debt collection issues, 
including the Fair Debt Collection Act, and has drawn on this expertise to provide 
information, legal research, policy analyses, and market insights to federal and 
state legislatures, administrative agencies, and the courts for over 40 years. NCLC 
is, among other roles and accomplishments, author of a widely praised twenty-
volume series of treatises on consumer law, including Fair Debt Collection (7th 
ed. 2011 and Supp.) and Collection Actions (2d ed. 2011 and Supp.). The Supreme 
Court of the United States has relied upon Fair Debt Collection as supporting 
authority. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA, 559 U.S. 
573, 591 n.12 (2010). 
The Public Justice Center (“PJC”) a not-for-profit civil rights and anti-
poverty legal services organization founded in 1985, has a longstanding 
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commitment to protecting and advancing consumers’ rights. The PJC has 
participated in a number of Maryland cases guarding the rights of consumers, 
including in the contexts of creditors’ requests for attorneys’ fees, arbitration 
agreements, and access to justice. The PJC participated directly in and 
contributed significantly to the deliberations of the Rules Committee on the 
recent amendments to Rule 3-306 and has an interest in this case because it 
addresses the critical issues of due process in an area of civil litigation that has a 
substantial impact on the lives of poor people. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case presents the question of whether documents created by third party 
predecessors in interest—usually a bank—may be admitted into evidence when a  
debt buyer  plaintiff does not demonstrate personal knowledge regarding any of the 
foundational elements which would be required to admit the documents under the  
business records exception to the hearsay rule. Amici urge this Court to overturn 
the lower court, and hold that a debt buyer’s documents may not be admitted into 
evidence without the debt buyer first laying the proper foundation for the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule. See Rules 5-101 and 5-803(b)(6) (demanding 
the indicia of reliability which ensures the judgments Maryland courts render are 
fundamentally fair); see also Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 19, 887 A.2d 602, 613 
(2005) (in order for a business record to be admitted into evidence, “testimony 
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must be given by a witness who possesses the necessary knowledge to establish” . . 
. “the requirements of Rule 5-803(b)(6) and to establish its authentication or 
identification”) (quotation omitted). Additionally, a debt buyer may not avoid the  
rule against hearsay by claiming it has the records of another entity in its 
possession. See Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. at 20-1, 887 A.2d at 613-14 (“[an] 
outsider's statement must fall within another hearsay exception to be admissible 
because it does not have the presumption of accuracy that statements made during 
the regular course of business have.”  (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence § 292, at 
277)); CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W. 3d 58, 63 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (excluding 
records generated by bank because debt buyer is not competent to testify as to 
business records of bank). 
Effective as of January 1, 2012, the Court of Appeals adopted 
comprehensive amendments to the Maryland Rules for obtaining judgments on 
affidavits in uncontested debt buyer cases in District Court to counter documented 
litigation abuses perpetrated by debt buyers. See Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, 171st Report, 31-47 (2011) (“Report”); see also Rules 
Order, Court of Appeals (Sept. 8, 2011) (adopting the report). The major thrust of 
the rules amendments is to require submission of specific information to obtain a  
judgment on affidavit, “enhance transparency,” and ensure that judges have 
available a reliable level of documentation to enable them to determine whether a  
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debt buyer has proved both liability and damages. See Report, at 8 (stating that in 
order to promote transparency in the judicial process, courts need to require 
additional information in judgment-by-affidavit cases); see also, Rule 3-306.  
As recognized by comments received by the the Rules Committee, the debt 
buying industry is structured in such a way that in most cases, a debt buyer does 
not have access to basic contract and account level information necessary to avoid 
collection abuses, including collection against the wrong person or in the wrong 
amount. See FTC, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry, ii-iv 
(Jan. 3, 2013) (“FTC Debt Buying Report”) (finding debt buyers rarely receive any 
documents related to the debts, such as account statements or the terms and 
conditions of credit, and their ability to obtain same, if such documents even 
existed, was limited). Despite the fact that “the plaintiff often has insufficient 
reliable documentation” to prove a debt is owed by a particular person in a 
particular amount, millions of default judgments are entered every year because 
alleged debtors usually do not have legal representation and do not appear in court 
to defend such lawsuits.3 Report, at 7; see also FTC Debt Buying Report, at ii-iv. 
                                     
3 The Rules Committee recognized that in the vast majority of debt buyer cases, the 
court grants the debt buyer a default judgment because the consumer has failed to 
appear for trial. Report, at 7. In many of these instances, debtors simply do not 
know they have been sued due to improper service. See Debt Weight: The 
Consumer Credit Crisis In New York And Its Impact On The Working Poor, Urban 
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Because most judgments are entered by default, debt buyers have enjoyed the 
absence of adversarial proceedings and rigorous judicial scrutiny that would 
normally prevent entry of judgments on invalid or insufficient claims.  
The lack of judicial scrutiny has emboldened the debt buying industry to 
take legal shortcuts, resulting in an explosion of collection suits filed in Maryland 
as well as nationwide. Lacking adequate proof, and in many cases contrary to debt 
portfolio purchase agreements that sell the debt “as is” and explicitly disclaim 
warranties as to accuracy, debt buyers create the misleading perception that they 
are seeking to collect a valid, timely debt from the right person and for the right 
amount. See Report, at 8; Rick Jurgens & Robert J. Hobbs, The Debt Machine: 
How the Collection Industry Hounds Consumers and Overwhelms Courts, Nat’l 
Consumer Law Ctr., 11 (2010) (“NCLC Debt Machine”).  
As a matter of basic due process, and to ensure that the purpose of the Rules 
amendments is realized and efforts to ensure fairness are not thwarted, this Court 
                                                                                                                      
Justice Center, 7, 20 (2007), available at http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/ 
publications/http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/CDP_Debt_Weight.pdf. 
Debt buyers often send notices to addresses listed in the underlying credit card 
accounts, however, these accounts are frequently several years old and contain 
outdated contact information. In addition, many process servers simply fail to serve 
papers but nonetheless sign false affidavits of service with the court. See Debt 
Deception: How Debt Buyers Abuse The System To Prey On Lower-Income New 
Yorkers, Neighborhood Econ. Dev. Advocacy Project 1 (2010), 
available at httpwww.nedap.org/pressroom/pressroom/documents/debt_deception_
final_web.pdf. 
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should hold that the Circuit Court erred in admitting third party hearsay documents 
proffered by a debt buyer affidavit. Order, E. 112. Rule 3-306 does not apply in a  
trial on the merits, and certainly does not automatically make documents 
admissible. Additionally, the informal nature of proceedings in small claims court 
do not make such documents automatically admissible, as Appellants argue in their 
brief in Bartlett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates., LLC, No. 24-C-13-001323 (Cir. 
Ct.), cert. granted, No. 64 (Md. Jul. 3, 2013), at 20. This Court should protect 
citizens and the integrity of Maryland courts by enforcing the full arsenal of 
professional, procedural, and substantive rules applicable to debt buyers.  
This Court should reverse the Circuit Court because the documents at issue 
were not admissible without foundational testimony from a competent witness.4 
  
                                     
4 In this case, the documents were actually admitted even though no witness for the 
Plaintiff even attempted to lay the foundation for their admission.  By admitting 
documents at a merits trial without any foundational testimony whatsoever, the 
lower court created a standard which is even lower than that required for an 
affidavit judgment under Rule 3-306 (which requires an affiant who is competent, 
who has personal knowledge of the matters asserted, and who is offering via 
affidavit “admissible evidence”).   
11 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT AMENDED ITS RULES TO ENSURE THAT 
JUDGMENT WOULD BE ENTERED IN DEBT BUYER 
CASES ONLY IF RELIABLE EVIDENCE PROVED BOTH 
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES. 
 
The recommendations of the Rules Committee adopted by this Court were  
designed to ensure that debt buyers prove with competent, admissible evidence that 
they own the debt they seek to collect, that they are suing the right person for the 
right amount, and that they have a legal right to a judgment. Amici adopt by 
reference the detailed account of the background and history of the rules 
amendment argued by the Brief for Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellant, Bartlett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates., LLC, at 7-11. The 
amendments were deemed essential to protect alleged debtors and the courts 
because of the flood of often questionable and abusive debt collection lawsuits.  
Strict scrutiny over the records of debt buyers and third party banks that sell 
debt portfolios is further warranted because banks are also implicated in the debt 
collection litigation abuses that the Rules Committee sought to combat. 
Increasingly widespread reports have surfaced that banks and debt buyers sell and 
resell clearly invalid debt—that which resulted from identity theft, was disputed, 
settled, discharged, paid in full, or is otherwise invalid. See Jeff Horwitz, Bank of 
America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty Records, Am. Banker (Mar. 
29, 2012, 6:31 pm. ET), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_62/bofa-
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credit-cards-collections-debts-faulty-records-1047992-1.html (“Horwitz Mar. 
2012”) (“Bank of America’s caution that its card records may be incomplete or 
inaccurate suggests that documentation and accuracy problems may originate at the 
debt’s source.”). “[E]ach year, buyers sought to collect about one million debts 
consumers did not owe,” and this may understate the problem. FTC Debt Buying 
Report, at iv. One Maryland consumer paid her debt in full, but even proof of 
payment would not deter debt buyers to whom her account was sold. Her three 
year nightmare ended only after she filed her own lawsuit. Maria Aspan, Borrower 
Beware: B of A Customer Repaid Her Bill Yet Faced a Collections Nightmare, 
Am. Banker, (Mar. 29, 2012, 5:47 pm ET) http://www.Americanbanker.com 
/issues/177_62/bofa-credit-cards-debt-collections-delinquent-robosigning-047991-
1.html. 
Of particular relevance to the case at bar are widespread allegations that J.P. 
Morgan Chase, the original owner of the debt alleged in the case at bar, sells debts 
that it knows to be invalid. See Jeff Horwitz, JPM Chase Quietly Halts Suits Over 
Consumer Debts, Am. Banker (Jan. 10, 2012, 5:55 pm ET) http://www. 
americanbanker.com/issues/177_7/jpmorgan-chase-consumer-debt-collection-1045 
606-1.html. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency instituted enforcement 
actions against Chase for such practices. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 
2013-138 (Dep’t of Treas. Sept. 18, 2013) (Consent Order), available at 
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http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-138.pdf (imposing $60 
million penalties and ordering correction of deficiencies). According to the 
Consent Order, “The Comptroller finds, and the Bank neither admits nor denies”  
that in its “sworn document and Collections Litigation,” Chase: 
a) Filed affidavits which falsely represented that they were based on 
personal knowledge; 
b) Filed inaccurate sworn documents that resulted in “judgments with 
financial errors in favor of the Bank”; 
c) Filed “numerous affidavits that were not properly notarized”; 
d) Failed to have proper procedures in place to ensure compliance with the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; 
e) Failed to devote sufficient resources to properly administer its 
collections litigation processes; 
f) Failed to devote adequate controls, policies and training to its collection 
litigation processes; 
g) Failed to sufficiently oversee outside counsel and other third party 
providers handling collection litigation services. 
Id., Article I, Paragraph 2.   
According to the Consent order, additional data integrity problems exist 
specifically in relation to the sale of charged off accounts by Chase to debt buyers. 
Chase must submit to the OCC “Revised policies and procedures to ensure that the 
Bank’s sales of charged-off consumer Accounts are consistent with the OCC’s 
expectations regarding the Bank’s debt sales activities” including: 
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(i) Processes, systems, and controls to ensure the accuracy and integrity 
of all information provided to any third party in connection with the 
sale of charged-off debt; 
 
* * * 
(vi) Processes to ensure that the information provided to debt buyers is 
sufficient and appropriate for debt collection activities in compliance  
with federal and state laws and regulations….  
 
Id., Article IV, paragraph (1)(p). 
The revelations about debt collection litigation abuses and the inaccuracy 
and lack of integrity in debt portfolio sales by Chase also prompted the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency to issue guidance to all the banks they supervise to 
halt such practices. See Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Prot. S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, (2013) (statement of Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the 
Currency) (discussing problems of banks selling debt without adequate controls); 
see also Jeff Horwitz and Maria Aspan, OCC Pressures Banks to Clean Up Card 
Debt Sales, Am. Banker (Jul. 2, 2013, 1:24 pm ET), http://www. 
americanbanker.com/issues/178_127/occ-pressures-banks-to-clean-up-card-debt-
sales-1060353-1.html; Maria Aspan, Wells Fargo Halts Card Debt Sales as 
Scrutiny Mounts, Am. Banker (Jul. 29, 2013, 10:00 pm ET), http://www. 
americanbanker.com/issues/178_144/wells-fargo-halts-card-debt-sales-as-scrutiny-
mounts-1060922-1.html. Additionally, the California Attorney General recently 
sued “to hold Chase accountable for systematically using illegal tactics to flood 
15 
 
California’s courts with specious lawsuits against consumers.” Press Release, CA 
Att’y Gen., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Suit Against 
JPMorgan Chase for Fraudulent and Unlawful Debt-Collection Practices (May 9, 
2013), available at http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-
d-harris-announces-suit-against-jpmorgan-chase (“Chase employed unlawful 
practices as shortcuts to obtain judgments against California consumers with speed 
and ease that could not have been possible if Chase had adhered to the minimum 
substantive and procedural protections required by law.”).  
In addition, Chase has also been ordered by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to pay a $20 million penalty and refund $309 million 
to more than 2.1 million customers for illegal credit card billing practices.5 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 
Sept. 18, 2013) (Consent Order), available at http://www.consumer 
finance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_jpmc_consent-order.pdf; see also Press Release, 
CFPB, CFPB Orders Chase and JPMorgan Chase to Pay $309 Million Refund for 
Illegal Credit Card Practices (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.consumer 
finance.gov/pressreleases/cfpb-orders-chase-and-jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-309-
                                     
5 Chase issues the AARP-branded Visa Cards available to qualifying AARP 
members.  Chase pays a royalty fee to AARP for the use of its intellectual property 
in relation to this credit card program. These fees are used for the general purposes 
of AARP.  
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million-refund-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/. The billing practices by Chase at 
issue in the CFPB enforcement action occurred from 2005-2012, suggesting that at 
least some of the debts Chase sold to debt buyers include such illegally charged 
amounts. Id.  
A. The Rule Amendments Set Forth And Explained The Heightened 
Gatekeeping Obligations Of Maryland Courts In Debt Buyer 
Litigation 
  
  Through the rules amendments, this Court set forth and explained the 
heightened gatekeeping obligations of Maryland courts in debt buyer litigation in 
the face of the improvident practices of debt buyers. Report, at 8. Courts in other 
states have come to similar conclusions—that “weak legal arguments compel the 
Court to stop [debt buyers] at the gate.” Commonwealth Fin. Sys., Inc., v. Smith, 15 
A.3d 492, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (citing In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 
1:07CV2282 et seq., 2007 WL 3232430, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31 2007) (“Neither 
the fluidity of the secondary [debt] market, nor monetary or economic 
considerations of the parties, nor the convenience of the litigants supersede[s] 
those obligations.”); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 15 Misc. 3d 1148(A), 841 
N.Y.S.2d 826, *1 (Civ. Ct. 2007) (“The judiciary continues to provide an 
important role in safeguarding consumer rights and in overseeing the fairness of 
the debt collection process.”).  
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Debt buyers assert claims even where the evidence necessary to prove the 
claim is unavailable—and what little information is available is known to be 
inaccurate or is subject to explicit disclaimers as to accuracy—because they know 
few debtors will be able to defend against even spurious claims. See Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom – In Lawsuits, Wall St. J. 
(Nov. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304510704575 
562212919179410.html (reporting that by industry estimates ninety-four percent of 
collections end in default and that “[t]he majority of borrowers don’t have a 
lawyer, some don’t know they are even being sued, and others don’t appear in 
court, say judges.”). Debtors who receive notice of a lawsuit—although many do 
not because of faulty service—usually appear without legal representation if they 
appear at all.6 Often they either cannot afford an attorney or cannot find an attorney 
who will take their case. See Brief for Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellant, Bartlett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates., LLC, at 3; 
Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 
Mo. L. Rev 707, 721-26 (2008) (arguing that the typical consumer debtor’s 
                                     
6 In New York, for example, only 1% of defendants sued by creditors were 
represented by an attorney. Debt Deception at 1 (noting that ninety-five percent of 
457,322 lawsuits filed by twenty-six debt buyers against people residing in low- or 
moderate-income neighborhoods ended in default judgments, and not a single 
person in the study was represented by counsel). 
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“choice” to appear pro se and defend is involuntary). Notwithstanding having 
viable counterclaims and lacking any knowledge of their legal rights, alleged 
debtors must resort to appearing pro se and stumble through complex procedural 
and substantive law that even some trained attorneys do not fully understand.  
Debt buyers exploit unrepresented consumers through judicial collections: 
the threat of litigation is sufficient to force payment even if a debtor has a valid 
defense. An alleged debtor faced with a court summons may believe that a 
collector would not be allowed to bring a case that could not be proven in court 
and that he has no choice but to make payments to avoid a judgment. See Kimber 
v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (reasoning that 
unsophisticated “consumers would unwittingly acquiesce” to a time-barred lawsuit 
instead of defending against it). Moreover, the Kimber court noted that,  
even if the consumer realizes that she can use time as a defense, she  
will more than likely still give in rather than fight the lawsuit because 
she must still expend energy and resources and subject herself to 
the embarrassment of going into court to present the defense; this is 
particularly true in light of the costs of attorneys today.  
 
Id. As explained by one commentator, “a civil filing serves as a credible threat to 
inflict harm on the defendant[’s credit rating and thus] may induce the defendant to 
pay.” Richard Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection In State 
Courts, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2008). The CFPB has asserted supervisory authority 
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over debt buyers, recognizing that the coercive power of judicial debt collection 
creates a major consumer protection concern:  
Whether or not consumers owe and are liable for the debts collectors 
are attempting to recover, unlawful collection practices can cause 
significant reputational damage, invade personal privacy, [ ] inflict 
emotional distress[,] interfere[] with a consumer's employment 
relationships . . . [and] impair the consumer's ability to repay debts. 
 
Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Market, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 65775-01, 65777 (Oct. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090). 
Indeed, the price debt buyers pay for a particular debt portfolio is based upon the  
likelihood that a debtor will succumb to the pressure exerted by the threat or entry 
of a judgment rather than the legitimacy of the debt. See FTC, Collecting 
Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change - A Workshop Report, 20 (2009) 
(debt buyers use mathematical scoring models based on likelihood of collection to 
determine whether to purchase a portfolio and how much to pay).7 
In the face of such challenges, and consistent with the intent of the Rules 
Committee in recommending the amendments, this Court should strictly uphold the 
legal standard that all litigants—including debt buyers in small claims actions—
must satisfy in order to establish a business records exception to the rule against 
the admissibility of hearsay.  
                                     
7 Available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshop/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf. 
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B. The Rules Were Revised To Prevent Entry Of Judgments  
On Affidavit Without Reliable Information To Prove  
Liability And Damages, Not To Supplant The Rules That  
Ensure Fairness In A Trial On The Merits 
 
In all debt buyer cases, the amendments to Rule 3-306 establish the 
minimum reliable information necessary to support a valid judgment based on an 
affidavit when the defendant does not file a Notice of Intention to Defend. Rule 3-
306 is “procedural only.” Committee Note, Rule 3-306(d)(2). Rule 3-306 and the 
relaxation of certain evidentiary requirements in small claims court pursuant to 
Rule 5-101 do not obviate requirements for fairness and due process. See Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 125th Report, 6 (July 7, 1992) 
(amending Rule 5-101, clarifying “courts cannot allow persons who are legally 
incompetent as witnesses to testify even if the rules of evidence  generally are 
inapplicable”). The 1992 Rules Committee note explicitly provides:  
Rule 5-101 is not intended to preclude a court from relying on the 
rules to advance fairness in a proceeding that is not formally bound by 
the Rules. . . . Nor, of course, does Rule 5-101 override constitutional 
guarantees, such as due process or confrontation. 
 
Id.; see also Ridgeway Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Seidman, 243 Md. 358, 364, 221 A.2d 
393, 396 (1966) (“Of course, cross-examination plays a most important part in the  
administration of justice in this country. It has been stated that it is one of the most 
efficacious tests for the discovery of the truth.”). The reason that the rules of 
evidence relating to the competency of witnesses always apply in all cases in 
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Maryland is to prevent the admission of unreliable evidence—the exact error that 
occurred in this case. See Rule 5-101(b)(4). Having relaxed rules of evidence (or 
even no rules of evidence) does not mean that documents are automatically 
admissible, regardless of how incompetent (or nonexistent) the sponsoring witness 
is. 
Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that the Rules Committee or this Court 
ever intended to create a lower burden at trial for debt buyers than would exist for 
any other litigant. Even in small claims court, the absence of a competent witness 
to testify to such documentation or other reliable form of proof of both liability and 
damages should prevent a judgment from being entered.  
  Neither the rules amendments nor a relaxation of the hearsay rules implicate  
the substantive burdens of proof necessary to obtain a judgment in small claims 
court. For example, the debt buyer must prove ownership of the debt—a burden of 
production imposed by substantive law, not the rules of evidence. See 6 Am. Jur. 2 
Assignments §148 (2013) (“The assignee’s burden of proving the existence of the 
assignment is met by evidence that is satisfactory in character to protect the 
defendant from another action by the alleged assignor, and which shows that there 
was a full and complete assignment of the claim from an assignor who was the real 
party in interest with respect to the claim.”). This is not merely a technicality, but 
rather, implicates due process: if judgment is entered and the debtor pays on the  
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debt, he may be forced to pay a second time to the rightful owner of the debt.  “It 
has long been recognized in this State that when a maker of a note pays the debt to 
someone who does not have possession of the note, such payment is no defense to 
an action by the holder of the note.”  Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine LLC, 180 Md. 
App. 535, 561, 952 A.2d 304, 320 (2008).  
  Similarly, pursuant to substantive law, a debt buyer is not competent to 
testify as to the business records of another business in order to prove the amount 
of an alleged debt. As explained by the Missouri Supreme Court in CACH, LLC v. 
Askew, “[a]ll of the requirements of [the business record rule] must be satisfied for 
a record to be admitted as competent evidence .” 358 S.W.3d at 63. The court 
explained:  
To satisfy [all the] requirements [of the business records rule], the 
records ‘custodian’ or ‘other qualified witness’ has to testify to the 
record’s identity, mode of preparation, and that it was made in the 
regular course of business, at or near the time of the event that it 
records. For that reason, a document that is prepared by one business 
cannot qualify for the business records exception merely based on 
another business’s records custodian testifying that it appears in the 
files of the business that did not create the record.8 
 
Id.  Maryland courts follow this rule also.  In Davis v. Goodman, the court found 
“[i]nformation from a person who is not a part of the business and has no duty to 
                                     
8 Maryland requires that the documents be “made and kept” in the normal course of 
business.  Rule 5-803(b)(6). 
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report will not be admissible simply because it is included in a business record.” 
117 Md. App. 378, 419, 700 A.2d 798, 817-18 (1997).  
Indeed, in the case at bar, the affiant, an employee of Midland Credit 
Management, E. 46, does not even “have an identity of interest with” the plaintiff-
respondent, Midland Funding, LLC. Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md. App. at 419, 700 
A.2d at 818. The affidavit is artfully drafted to give the appearance that the records 
are admissible when in fact they are not: it purports to establish only personal 
knowledge of Midland Credit Management’s record keeping practices—not 
personal knowledge of Midland Funding’s or Chase’s record keeping procedures, 
and not of the debtor or the debt itself. Thus, “there is no circumstantial guarantee 
of sincerity” to permit admission of the documents into evidence. Id.  
It is even questionable whether an affiant of a debt buyer, including Midland 
Funding, is competent to testify to its own business records in light of widespread 
evidence of robo-signing. See NCLC Debt Machine, at 22. The term “robo-
signing,” so familiar in the foreclosure context has already been used to describe 
Midland’s practice of executing false affidavits which were used in litigation 
nationwide.  See Midland Funding, LLC v. Brent, 644 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (N.D. 
Ohio 2009) (debt buyer employee admitting to robo-signing affidavits pursuant to 
standard company procedure and noting the “percentage of [affidavits] that are 
checked for accuracy is ‘very few and far between.’”); Vassalle v. Midland 
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Funding, 708 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied Nos. 11-
3814/3961/4016/4019/4021, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7988 (6th Cir. Apr. 19, 2013) 
(reversing approval of inadequate nationwide class action settlement of FDCPA 
claims asserting collector routinely obtained state court judgments using false 
affidavits because, inter alia, it did not enjoin such practices); David Segal, Debt 
Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer's Cramp, N.Y. Times, A1 (Nov. 1, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/business/01debt.html (noting robo-signing is 
a common and long-entrenched practice in the collections industry, although it has 
garnered far less public attention than in the foreclosure context). An employee of 
one debt buyer said he was required to sign hundreds of affidavits a day, while an 
employee of another debt buyer said that she signed, on average, an affidavit every 
13 seconds. Id. Researchers in a New York study found that over the course of a 
year, an affiant for one debt buyer identified himself as the custodian of records in 
47,503 lawsuits. Debt Deception, at 14; see also, Jeff Horwitz, State AGs Probing 
Sales of Credit Card Debt, Am. Banker (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:22 pm ET)) 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_180/state-attorneys-general-probing-
sales-of-credit-card-debt-1052724-1.html (reporting “managers of a credit card 
processing facility in San Antonio ordered its employees to robo-sign affidavits 
attesting to the accuracy of debts owed by Chase customers.”).   
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Contrary to the holding of the Circuit Court and the rule urged by 
Respondent Midland Funding, Rule 3-306 was never intended to reduce the 
substantive standards, burdens of proof, or due process protections that ensure 
trials are fair. The amendments established the floor for the minimum reliable 
information required to obtain a judgment on affidavit in debt buyer cases when no 
Notice of Intention to Defend has been filed by the defendant. Rule 3-306 was 
amended to provide an additional backstop to prevent unjustified judgments from 
being entered when the defendant is completely absent from the proceeding.   
Judges should not admit documents into evidence when there is no witness 
for the Plaintiff to vouch for or be subject to cross examination on the issues of 
authenticity, relevance and reliability of documents which are proffered by a debt 
buyer’s attorney. Doing so would reverse the burden of proof: it would require an 
alleged debtor to disprove liability and damages rather than for a debt buyer to 
prove it is entitled to judgment. By admitting documents that are recognized by the 
Rules Committee to be inherently unreliable based on overwhelming nationwide 
evidence of industry practice, some trial courts have created a de facto small 
claims debt buyer exception to the rules of evidence (Rule 5-101) and procedure  
(Rule 3-306) which should not be permitted. 
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II. MARYLAND COURTS MUST PRESERVE DUE  
PROCESS AND PROTECT THE FAIRNESS OF  
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
  
Procedural safeguards are required to avoid the risk of erroneous judgments 
especially where, as here, defendants do not currently have a recognized right to 
counsel and rarely have access to counsel. See e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507, 2520 (2011) (noting “the Due Process Clause … does not require the 
provision of counsel … [if] the State provides alternative procedural safeguards.”). 
Further, the court has the inherent authority, and indeed, the obligation, to ensure 
the fairness of the proceedings. Maryland courts have found consistently that due 
process demands, at the very least, a finding that hearsay evidence is reliable. See 
Appellant’s Br., Bartlett v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Md. No 64, at 22-
23. Moreover, in admitting the documents into evidence without any witness, the  
Circuit Court deprived the Appellant of a fundamental and constitutionally 
mandated due process protection: the right to cross examine the witness.  In Fine v. 
Kolodny, 263 Md. 647, 652, 284 A.2d 409, 412 (1971), this Court explained: 
there is yet a more significant reason as to why [plaintiff’s] statements 
should not be equated with testimony, namely, because these 
statements were not subject to cross-examination by the defendants' 
counsel or subject to impeachment. Indeed, the defendants did not 
even have the opportunity to question her capacity to testify, were 
they so disposed. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. II, s 477, 3rd ed. This in 
our opinion would constitute a violation of the ‘due process’ clause of 
the Constitution of the United States (Article XIV, Section 1) and 
Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 
Maryland. 
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The Rules Committee sought to ensure that even if an alleged debtor does 
not appear to defend a debt buyer lawsuit, the judge has the information necessary 
to decide whether the debt buyer is entitled to judgment on affidavit. In the rare 
case when an alleged debtor does seek to defend a claim, due process requires that 
she be permitted to cross examine the Plaintiff’s witnesses.   
A. The Court’s Obligation To Ensure A Fair Trial For Pro Se 
Litigants Is Not Contrary To Rule 3-306 Or A Relaxation Of 
The Rules Of Evidence In Small Claims Court. 
 
 With the full knowledge that many litigants are forced by circumstances to 
proceed in litigation without a lawyer, the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct 
encourages judges to make “reasonable accommodations to ensure self-represented 
litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.” Maryland Code of 
Judicial Conduct 2.2 (“CJCR”). Entering judgment against an unrepresented 
litigant when no competent witness testifies is neither accommodating nor fair to 
the pro se litigant.  
CJCR 2.6 also discusses the importance of ensuring that pro se litigants 
receive a fair trial. Specifically, CJCR 2.6, comment 2, explains that self-
represented litigants often lack knowledge of the law, and judicial procedures 
“may inhibit their ability to be heard effectively” given that lack of legal training 
makes it is difficult for pro se litigants to defend themselves. Courts are not 
required to go to great lengths to help pro se litigants who must frequently defend 
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claims of debt buyers in small claims court, but courts may not tip the scales so far 
in the debt collector’s direction. The Rules Committee made it clear that the 
purpose of the rules amendments was to “ensure fairness to all parties.”  Report, at 
41 (emphasis added). Courts should, at the very least, observe the fundamental 
procedural protections that they follow in every other small claims case, such as 
requiring that evidence be admitted only through testimony from competent 
witnesses, and barring unreliable documents from admission into evidence.  
The Maryland Access to Justice Commission has also explained the 
importance of affording pro se litigants the opportunity for a fair trial. The 
commission was established in 2008 by then Chief Judge Robert M. Bell to expand 
access to Maryland’s civil justice system. Interim Report & Recommendations, 
Maryland Access to Justice Commission 1 (Fall 2009).9 The commission 
emphasized the importance of “ensur[ing] that individuals can obtain legal 
representation when they need it.” Id. at 2. At the same time, the commission 
recognized that there is a “critical shortage” of funding for legal services. Id. In 
recognition of the goals of the Maryland Access to Justice Commission and the 
inability of consumer debtors to obtain legal counsel, courts should not make it 
                                     
9 Available at http://www.mdcourts.gov/mdatjc/pdfs/interimreport111009.pdf. 
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more difficult for pro se litigants to contest the claims that are being made against 
them. 
B. This Court Should Protect Due Process, Fairness, And The 
Integrity Of Maryland Courts By Enforcing Rules That 
Prevent Debt Buyers From Making Claims Without Regard 
To Accuracy. 
 
In light of the abundant evidence of widespread false and inaccurate 
information contained in debt buyer lawsuits, lawyers, as well as judges, should be  
on heightened alert to prevent the exploitation of unrepresented defendants in 
litigation. Rule 3.3(a) of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(MRPC) prohibits attorneys from “knowingly . . . mak[ing] a false statement of 
fact . . . to a tribunal or fail[ing] to correct a false statement of material fact . . . 
previously made to the tribunal.” Md. R. Cts. J. And Attys. 16-812, MRPC 3.3(a).  
Additionally, Rule 8.4(c) of the MRPC states that “[i]t is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.” Md. R. Cts. J. And Attys. 16-812, MRPC 8.4(c). While Rule  
3.3(a) only prohibits attorneys from knowingly making false statements of fact, 
this Court has stated that Rule 8.4(c) can be violated either intentionally or 
negligently. Atty. Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Nwadike, 416 Md. 180, 193, 6 A.3d 
287, 295 (2010).  
When judges permit attorneys for debt buyers to simply offer documents 
into evidence with no competent supporting testimony, they are opening the door 
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to potential abuse. Admitting such documents into evidence permits attorneys 
representing debt buyers potentially to make knowing or negligent 
misrepresentations of fact in violation of MRPC Rules 3.3(a) and 8.4(c) without 
providing consumer debtors with a means to challenge the veracity of such 
representations. In fact, lawyers in Maryland for some debt buyers file cases in 
such volume, and with such a high rate of factual error, that it is hard to imagine 
that the lawyer adequately and competently reviews the complaint and attachments 
in each lawsuit in a manner which is consistent with Rule 1-311. 
The even bigger problem is that lawyers for debt buyers fail to and refuse to 
disclose the terms and conditions of the Purchase and Sale Agreements between 
the bank and the debt buyer. Such contracts often list extremely broad disclaimers 
of warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of the bank’s records regarding the  
debtor or the debt. See e.g., “Bill of Sale.” App. 67 (stating “[t]his Bill of Sale is 
executed without recourse except as stated in the Credit Card Account Purchase 
Agreement to which this is an Exhibit. No other representation of or warranty of 
title or enforceability is expressed or implied.”); Horwitz Mar. 2012 (explaining 
debt is sold in contracts which typically disclaim “‘any representations, warranties, 
promises, covenants, agreements, or guaranties of any kind or character 
whatsoever’ about the accuracy or completeness of the debts’ records,” and reveal 
that “some of the claims it sold might already have been extinguished in 
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bankruptcy court,” some balances are “approximate,”... or some “consumers have 
already paid back in full.”).  
Courts should not tolerate debt buyers who mislead the tribunal through 
omissions of material fact as to the accuracy of the claims made in light of the 
contrary contractual disclaimers. See Erin Servs. Co., LLC. v. Bohnet, 26 Misc.3d 
1230(A), 907 N.Y.S.2d 100, at *1 (Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2010) (finding eighteen 
ethical violations, warning “‘[h]igh volume’ debt collection law practices are 
subject to the same ethical rules as apply to lawyers handling any other civil 
litigation matter.”); Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 101 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding “[a]s in the analogous Rule 11 context, an attorney 
responsible for issuing and executing a legal document ‘must make a reasonable  
inquiry personally.’” (quoting Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1280 
(3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)). In Miller, the court criticized an attorney’s 
reliance on the evaluation of governing law made by previous collectors and the 
failure to undertake any independent review as being “a naked attempt to substitute 
their judgment for his own in derogation of his professional duties and his 
obligations under the FDCPA.” Miller, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 101. Miller concluded: 
in cases such as here, where an attorney commences suit in so 
uninformed a manner that he is ignorant even as to what law governs 
his suit, it cannot be said that he has undertaken a level of review 
sufficient to satisfy even the most general requirements applicable to 
attorney conduct, let alone the more focused review requirements 
established by the FDCPA. 
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Id. at 98.  
Debt buyers who seek judgments based on unverified and unverifiable 
information are going to court with unclean hands. In Adams v. Manown, this 
Court stated that the unclean hands doctrine “is not applied for the protection of the 
parties nor as a punishment to the wrongdoer; rather, the doctrine is intended to 
protect the courts from having to endorse or reward inequitable conduct.” 328 Md. 
463, 474-75 (1992) (emphasis added). Asserting the right to a judgment based on 
unverified and unverifiable evidence is precisely the type of inequitable conduct 
envisioned by Adams. As held in Atty. Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Dore,  
Even the slightest accommodation of deceit or a lack of candor in any 
material respect quickly erodes the validity of the process. As soon as the  
process falters in that respect, the people are then justified in abandoning 
support for the system in favor of one where honesty is preeminent. 
 
2013 Md. LEXIS 570, 44-45 (Md. Aug. 20, 2013); 
In order to protect the usually unrepresented alleged debtor, and to ensure  
the integrity of Maryland courts, this Court should strictly uphold the requirement 
that judgments must be based on competent, reliable evidence, and bring the full 
arsenal of the court’s tools to bear to prevent erroneous judgments from being 
entered in debt buyer cases. 
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TEXT OF PERTINENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
RULE 1-311. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS 
(a) Requirement. Every pleading and paper of a party represented by an attorney 
shall be signed by at least one attorney who has been admitted to practice law in 
this State and who complies with Rule 1-312. Every pleading and paper of a party 
who is not represented by an attorney shall be signed by the party. Every pleading 
or paper filed shall contain the signer’s address, telephone number, facsimile 
number, if any, and e-mail address, if any. 
Committee note: The requirement that a pleading contain a facsimile number, if 
any, and e-mail address, if any, does not alter the filing or service rules or time 
periods triggered by the entry of a judgment. See Blundon v. Taylor, 364 Md. 1 
(2001). 
 (b) Effect of Signature. The signature of an attorney on a pleading or paper 
constitutes a certification that the attorney has read the pleading or paper; that to 
the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground 
to support it; and that it is not interposed for improper purpose or delay. 
(c) Sanctions. If a pleading or paper is not signed as required (except inadvertent 
omission to sign, if promptly corrected) or is signed with intent to defeat the 
purpose of this Rule, it may be stricken and the action may proceed as though the 
pleading or paper had not been filed. For a wilful violation of this Rule, an attorney 
is subject to appropriate disciplinary action. 
  
RULE 3-306. JUDGMENT ON AFFIDAVIT 
(a) Definitions. In this Rule the following definitions apply except as expressly 
otherwise provided or as necessary implication requires: 
 
(1) Charge-off. “Charge-off” means the act of a creditor that treats an account 
receivable or other debt as a loss or expense because payment is unlikely. 
 
(2) Charge-off Balance. “Charge-off balance” means the amount due on the 
account or debt at the time of charge-off. 
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(3) Consumer Debt. “Consumer debt” means a secured or unsecured debt that is 
for money owed or alleged to be owed and arises from a consumer transaction. 
 
(4) Consumer Transaction. “Consumer transaction” means a transaction involving 
an individual seeking or acquiring real or personal property, services, future 
services, money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes. 
 
(5) Original Creditor. “Original creditor” means the lender, provider, or other 
person to whom a consumer originally was alleged to owe money pursuant to a 
consumer transaction. “Original creditor” includes the Central Collection Unit, a 
unit within the State Department of Budget and Management. 
 
(6) Original Consumer Debt. “Original consumer debt” means the total of the 
consumer debt alleged to be owed to the original creditor, consisting of principal, 
interest, fees, and any other charges. 
 
Committee note: If there has been a charge-off, the amount of the “original 
consumer debt” is the same as the “charge-off balance.” 
 
(7) Principal. “Principal” means the unpaid balance of the funds borrowed, the 
credit utilized, the sales price of goods or services obtained, or the capital sum of 
any other debt or obligation arising from a consumer transaction, alleged to be 
owed to the original creditor. It does not include interest, fees, or charges added to 
the debt or obligation by the original creditor or any subsequent assignees of the 
consumer debt. 
 
(8) Future Services. “Future services” means one or more services that will be 
delivered at a future time. 
 
(9) Future Services Contract. “Future services contract” means an agreement that 
obligates a consumer to purchase a future service from a provider. 
 
(10) Provider. “Provider” means any person who sells a service or future service to 
a consumer. 
 
(b) Demand for Judgment by Affidavit. In an action for money damages a 
plaintiff may file a demand for judgment on affidavit at the time of filing the 
complaint commencing the action. The complaint shall be supported by an 
affidavit showing that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in the 
amount claimed. 
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(c) Affidavit and Attachments--General Requirements. The affidavit shall: 
 
(1) be made on personal knowledge; 
 
(2) set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence;  
 
(3) show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
in the affidavit; and; 
 
(4) include or be accompanied by: 
 
(A) supporting documents or statements containing sufficient detail as to liability 
and damages, including the precise amount of the claim and any interest claimed;  
 
(B) if interest is claimed, an interest worksheet substantially in the form prescribed 
by the Chief Judge of the District Court;  
 
(C) if attorneys' fees are claimed, sufficient proof evidencing that the plaintiff is 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and that the fees are reasonable; and  
 
(D) if the claim is founded upon a note, security agreement, or other instrument, 
the original or a photocopy of the executed instrument, or a sworn or certified 
copy, unless the absence thereof is explained in the affidavit.  
 
(d) If Claim Arises from Assigned Consumer Debt. If the claim arises from 
consumer debt and the plaintiff is not the original creditor, the affidavit also shall 
include or be accompanied by (i) the items listed in this section, and (ii) an 
Assigned Consumer Debt Checklist, substantially in the form prescribed by the 
Chief Judge of the District Court, listing the items and information supplied in or 
with the affidavit in conformance with this Rule. Each document that accompanies 
the affidavit shall be clearly numbered as an exhibit and referenced by number in 
the Checklist. 
 
(1) Proof of the Existence of the Debt or Account. Proof of the existence of the debt 
or account shall be made by a certified or otherwise properly authenticated 
photocopy or original of at least one of the following: 
 
(A) a document signed by the defendant evidencing the debt or the opening of the 
account;  
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(B) a bill or other record reflecting purchases, payments, or other actual use of a 
credit card or account by the defendant; or  
 
(C) an electronic printout or other documentation from the original creditor 
establishing the existence of the account and showing purchases, payments, or 
other actual use of a credit card or account by the defendant.  
 
(2) Proof of Terms and Conditions. 
 
(A) Except as provided in subsection (d)(2)(B) of this Rule, if there was a 
document evidencing the terms and conditions to which the consumer debt was 
subject, a certified or otherwise properly authenticated photocopy or original of the 
document actually applicable to the consumer debt at issue shall accompany the 
affidavit.  
 
(B) Subsection (d)(2)(A) of this Rule does not apply if (i) the consumer debt is an 
unpaid balance due on a credit card; (ii) the original creditor is or was a financial 
institution subject to regulation by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council or a constituent federal agency of that Council; and (iii) the claim does not 
include a demand or request for attorneys' fees or interest on the charge-off balance 
in excess of the Maryland Constitutional rate of six percent per annum.  
 
Committee note: This Rule is procedural only, and subsection (d)(2)(B)(iii) is not 
intended to address the substantive issue of whether interest in any amount may be 
charged on a part of the charge-off balance that, under applicable and enforceable 
Maryland law, may be regarded as interest. 
 
Cross reference: See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Uniform 
Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 36903-
-36906 (June 12, 2000). 
 
(3) Proof of Plaintiff's Ownership. The affidavit shall contain a statement that the 
plaintiff owns the consumer debt. It shall include or be accompanied by: 
 
(A) a chronological listing of the names of all prior owners of the debt and the date 
of each transfer of ownership of the debt, beginning with the name of the original 
creditor; and  
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(B) a certified or other properly authenticated copy of the bill of sale or other 
document that transferred ownership of the debt to each successive owner, 
including the plaintiff.  
 
Committee note: If a bill of sale or other document transferred debts in addition to 
the consumer debt upon which the action is based, the documentation required by 
subsection (d)(3)(B) of this Rule may be in the form of a redacted document that 
provides the general terms of the bill of sale or other document and the document's 
specific reference to the debt sued upon. 
 
(4) Identification and Nature of Debt or Account. The affidavit shall include the 
following information: 
 
(A) the name of the original creditor;  
 
(B) the full name of the defendant as it appears on the original account;  
 
(C) the last four digits of the social security number for the defendant appearing on 
the original account, if known;  
 
(D) the last four digits of the original account number; and  
 
(E) the nature of the consumer transaction, such as utility, credit card, consumer 
loan, retail installment sales agreement, service, or future services.  
 
(5) Future Services Contract Information. If the claim is based on a future services 
contract, the affidavit shall contain facts evidencing that the plaintiff currently is 
entitled to an award of damages under that contract. 
 
(6) Account Charge-off Information. If there has been a charge-off of the account, 
the affidavit shall contain the following information: 
 
(A) the date of the charge-off;  
 
(B) the charge-off balance;  
 
(C) an itemization of any fees or charges claimed by the plaintiff in addition to the 
charge-off balance;  
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(D) an itemization of all post-charge-off payments received and other credits to 
which the defendant is entitled; and  
 
(E) the date of the last payment on the consumer debt or of the last transaction 
giving rise to the consumer debt.  
 
(7) Information for Debts and Accounts not Charged Off. If there has been no 
charge-off, the affidavit shall contain: 
 
(A) an itemization of all money claimed by the plaintiff, (i) including principal, 
interest, finance charges, service charges, late fees, and any other fees or charges 
added to the principal by the original creditor and, if applicable, by subsequent 
assignees of the consumer debt and (ii) accounting for any reduction in the amount 
of the claim by virtue of any payment made or other credit to which the defendant 
is entitled;  
 
(B) a statement of the amount and date of the consumer transaction giving rise to 
the consumer debt, or in instances of multiple transactions, the amount and date of 
the last transaction; and  
 
(C) a statement of the amount and date of the last payment on the consumer debt.  
 
(8) Licensing Information. The affidavit shall include a list of all Maryland 
collection agency licenses that the plaintiff currently holds and provide the 
following information as to each: 
 
(A) license number,  
 
(B) name appearing on the license, and  
 
(C) date of issue.  
 
(e) Subsequent Proceedings. 
 
(1) When Notice of Intention to Defend Filed. If the defendant files a timely notice 
of intention to defend pursuant to Rule 3-307, the plaintiff shall appear in court on 
the trial date prepared for a trial on the merits. If the defendant fails to appear in 
court on the trial date, the court may proceed as if the defendant failed to file a 
timely notice of intention to defend. 
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(2) When No Notice of Intention to Defend Filed. 
 
(A) If the defendant fails to file a timely notice of intention to defend, the plaintiff 
need not appear in court on the trial date and the court may determine liability and 
damages on the basis of the complaint, affidavit, and supporting documents filed 
pursuant to this Rule. If the defendant fails to appear in court on the trial date and 
the court determines that the pleading and documentary evidence are sufficient to 
entitle the plaintiff to judgment, the court shall grant the demand for judgment on 
affidavit.  
 
(B) If the court determines that the pleading and documentary evidence are 
insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to judgment on affidavit, the court may deny the 
demand for judgment on affidavit or may grant a continuance to permit the 
plaintiff to supplement the documentary evidence filed with the demand. If the 
defendant appears in court at the time set for trial and it is established to the court's 
satisfaction that the defendant may have a meritorious defense, the court shall deny 
the demand for judgment on affidavit. If the demand for judgment on affidavit is 
denied or the court grants a continuance pursuant to this section, the clerk shall set 
a new trial date and mail notice of the reassignment to the parties, unless the 
plaintiff is in court and requests the court to proceed with trial.  
 
Cross reference: Rule 3-509. 
 
(f) Reduction in Amount of Damages. Before entry of judgment, the plaintiff 
shall inform the court of any reduction in the amount of the claim by virtue of any 
payment or other credit. 
 
(g) Notice of Judgment on Affidavit. When a demand for judgment on affidavit is 
granted, the clerk shall mail notice of the judgment promptly after its entry to each 
party at the latest address stated in the pleadings. The notice shall inform (1) the 
plaintiff of the right to obtain a lien on real property pursuant to Rule 3-621, and 
(2) the defendant of the right to file a motion to vacate the judgment within 30 days 
after its entry pursuant to Rule 3-535 (a). The clerk shall ensure that the docket or 
file reflects compliance with this section. 
 
 
 
RULE 5-101. SCOPE 
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(a) Generally. Except as otherwise provided by statute or rule, the rules in this 
Title apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this State. 
 
(b) Rules Inapplicable. The rules in this Title other than those relating to the 
competency of witnesses do not apply to the following proceedings: 
 
 * * * 
 
(4) Small claim actions under Rule 3-701 and appeals under Rule 7-112 (d)(2); 
 
* * * 
 
(12) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the rules in this Title, 
the court was traditionally not bound by the common-law rules of evidence. 
 
(c) Discretionary Application. In the following proceedings, the court, in the 
interest of justice, may decline to require strict application of the rules in this Title 
other than those relating to the competency of witnesses: 
 
(1) The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence 
when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 5-104 (a); 
 
* * * 
 
(10) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the rules in this Title, 
the court was authorized to decline to apply the common-law rules of evidence. 
 
(d) Privileges. In all actions and proceedings, lawful privileges shall be respected. 
 
 
Rule 5-803(b)(6)  
Rule 5-803. Hearsay exceptions: Unavailability of declarant not required 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness:  
(b)  Other exceptions 
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(6)  Records of regularly conducted business activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation of acts, events, 
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A) it was made at or near the 
time of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the 
diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or from 
information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was 
made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and (D) the regular practice of that business was to make 
and keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. A 
record of this kind may be excluded if the source of information or 
the method or circumstances of the preparation of the record 
indicate that the information in the record lacks trustworthiness. In 
this paragraph, "business" includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, 
whether or not conducted for profit.  
Cross references:  Rule 5-902(b). 
 
RULE 2.2. IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS 
 
A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial 
office impartially and fairly. 
 
COMMENT 
 
[1] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and 
open-minded. 
 
[2] Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and 
personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to 
whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in question. 
 
[3] When applying and interpreting the law, a judge sometimes may make good-
faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not violate this Rule. 
 
[4] It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable 
accommodations to ensure self-represented litigants the opportunity to have their 
matters fairly heard. 
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Cross reference: See Rule 2.6 Comment [2]. 
 
*  *  * 
 
RULE 2.6. ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD 
 
(a) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, 
or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. 
 
(b) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle 
matters in dispute but shall not act in a manner that coerces any party into 
settlement. 
 
COMMENT 
 
[1] The right to be heard is an essential component of a fair and impartial system 
of justice. Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if procedures 
protecting the right to be heard are observed. 
 
 
[2] Increasingly, judges have before them self-represented litigants whose lack of 
knowledge about the law and about judicial procedures and requirements may 
inhibit their ability to be heard effectively. A judge's obligation under Rule 2.2 to 
remain fair and impartial does not preclude the judge from making reasonable 
accommodations to protect a self-represented litigant's right to be heard, so long as 
those accommodations do not give the self-represented litigant an unfair 
advantage. This Rule does not require a judge to make any particular 
accommodation. 
 
[3] Settlement conferences and referrals to alternative dispute resolution may play 
an important role in the administration of justice. The judge plays an important role 
in overseeing the settlement of disputes, but should be careful that efforts to further 
settlement do not undermine any party's right to be heard according to law. Among 
the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon an appropriate 
settlement practice for a case are (a) whether the parties have requested or 
voluntarily consented to a certain level of participation by the judge in settlement 
discussions, (b) whether the parties and their counsel are relatively sophisticated in 
legal matters, (c) whether the case will be tried by the judge or a jury, (d) whether 
the parties participate with their counsel in settlement discussions, (e) whether any 
parties are self-represented, and (f) the nature of the proceeding. 
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[4] Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only 
on their objectivity and impartiality, but also on the appearance of their 
objectivity and impartiality. A judge should keep in mind the effect that the 
judge's participation in settlement discussions may have on both the judge's own 
views of the case and the perceptions of the lawyers and the parties if the case 
remains with the judge after settlement efforts are unsuccessful. Despite a judge's 
best efforts, there may be instances when information obtained during settlement 
discussions could influence a judge's decision making during trial, and, in such 
instances, the judge should consider whether disqualification may be appropriate. 
See Rule 2.11 (a)(1). 
 
*  *  * 
 
Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false 
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; 
 
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to 
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
 
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not 
disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
 
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered 
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable 
remedial measures. 
 
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, 
and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6. 
 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
false. 
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(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material 
facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed 
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. 
 
(e) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) through (d), a lawyer for an accused in a 
criminal case need not disclose that the accused intends to testify falsely or has 
testified falsely if the lawyer reasonably believes that the disclosure would 
jeopardize any constitutional right of the accused. 
 
COMMENT 
 
[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the 
proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(o) for the definition of “tribunal.” It also 
applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding 
conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. 
Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial 
measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition 
has offered evidence that is false. 
 
[2] This Rule sets forth special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting 
as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the 
client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining 
confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to 
the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not 
required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence 
submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false 
statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. 
 
Representations by a Lawyer 
 
[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for 
litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters 
asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, 
or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare 
Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, 
as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be 
made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on 
the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to 
make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The 
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obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the 
client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 
1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b). 
 
Misleading Legal Argument 
 
[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes 
dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested 
exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal 
authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to 
disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not 
been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal 
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly 
applicable to the case. 
 
False Evidence 
 
[5] When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided by a person who is 
not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the client's wishes. 
 
[6] When false evidence is offered by the client, however, a conflict may arise 
between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the duty 
of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining that material evidence is false, the lawyer 
should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered or, if it 
has been offered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If the 
persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. 
 
[7] Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is 
that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of 
the client's deception to the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can result 
in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also 
loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the 
lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding 
process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). 
Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty 
to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's 
advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the 
client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. 
 
Perjury by a Criminal Defendant 
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[8] Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has the same duty of disclosure 
has been intensely debated. While it is agreed that the lawyer should seek to 
persuade the client to refrain from perjurious testimony, there has been dispute 
concerning the lawyer's duty when that persuasion fails. If the confrontation with 
the client occurs before trial, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal 
before trial may not be possible, however, either because trial is imminent, or 
because the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial itself, or 
because no other counsel is available. 
 
[9] The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in a criminal case where the 
accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows that the testimony is 
perjurious. The lawyer's effort to rectify the situation can increase the likelihood of 
the client's being convicted as well as opening the possibility of a prosecution for 
perjury. On the other hand, if the lawyer does not exercise control over the proof, 
the lawyer participates, although in a merely passive way, in deception of the 
court. 
 
[10] Three resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed. One is to permit the 
accused to testify by a narrative without guidance through the lawyer's questioning. 
This compromises both contending principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty 
to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an implicit disclosure of 
information imparted to counsel. Another suggested resolution, of relatively recent 
origin, is that the advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if 
the perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent solution but makes the advocate a 
knowing instrument of perjury. 
 
[11] The other resolution of the dilemma is that the lawyer must reveal the client's 
perjury if necessary to rectify the situation. A criminal accused has a right to the 
assistance of an advocate, a right to testify and a right of confidential 
communication with counsel. However, an accused should not have a right to 
assistance of counsel in committing perjury. Furthermore, an advocate has an 
obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the law as well, to avoid 
implication in the commission of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See 
Rule 1.2(d). 
 
Remedial Measures 
 
[12] If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper 
course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that fails, the 
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advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal 
will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclosure 
to the court. It is for the court then to determine what should be done--making a 
statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps 
nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client, the client may controvert the 
lawyer's version of their communication when the lawyer discloses the situation to 
the court. If there is an issue whether the client has committed perjury, the lawyer 
cannot represent the client in resolution of the issue, and a mistrial may be 
unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to produce a series 
of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second such encounter could 
be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of 
the right to further representation. 
 
Constitutional Requirements 
 
[13] The general rule--that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with 
respect to a material fact, even that of a client--applies to defense counsel in 
criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the definition of the 
lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may be qualified by constitutional 
provisions for due process and the right to counsel in criminal cases. Paragraph (e) 
is intended to protect from discipline the lawyer who does not make disclosures 
mandated by paragraphs (a) through (d) only when the lawyer acts in the 
“reasonable belief” that disclosure would jeopardize a constitutional right of the 
client. For a definition of “reasonable belief,” see Rule 1.0(k). 
 
Duration of Obligation 
 
[14] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify the presentation of false 
evidence has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably 
definite point for the termination of the obligation. After that point, however, the 
lawyer may be permitted to take certain actions pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(3). 
 
Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to Be False 
[15] Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or 
other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may 
reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence 
and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. In criminal cases, 
however, a lawyer may, in some jurisdictions, be denied this authority by 
constitutional requirements governing the right to counsel. 
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Ex Parte Proceedings 
 
[16] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of 
the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting 
position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in an ex parte 
proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no 
balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte 
proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an 
affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer 
for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material 
facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to 
an informed decision. 
 
*  *  * 
 
RULE 8.4. MISCONDUCT 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another; 
 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
 
(e) knowingly manifest by words or conduct when acting in a professional capacity 
bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, 
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status when such action is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, provided, however, that legitimate advocacy is not a 
violation of this paragraph; 
 
(f) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or 
official or to achieve results by means that violate the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law; or 
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(g) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of 
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law. 
 
COMMENT 
 
[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the 
Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or 
instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not 
prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally 
entitled to take. 
 
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such 
as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax 
return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, 
the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving “moral turpitude.” That 
concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal 
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific 
connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally 
answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally 
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to 
law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious 
interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of 
repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, 
can indicate indifference to legal obligation. 
 
[3] Sexual misconduct or sexual harassment involving colleagues, clients, or co-
workers may violate paragraph (d) or (e). This could occur, for example, where 
coercion or undue influence is used to obtain sexual favor in exploitation of these 
relationships. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342 
(1993). See also Rule 1.7. 
 
[4] Paragraph (e) reflects the premise that a commitment to equal justice under the 
law lies at the very heart of the legal system. As a result, even when not otherwise 
unlawful, a lawyer who, while acting in a professional capacity, engages in the 
conduct described in paragraph (e) and by so doing prejudices the administration 
of justice commits a particularly egregious type of discrimination. Such conduct 
manifests a lack of character required of members of the legal profession. A trial 
judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory 
basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule. A judge, however, must 
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require lawyers to refrain from the conduct described in paragraph (e). See Md. 
Rule 16-813, Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.3. 
 
[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good 
faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) 
concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of 
the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. 
 
[6] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those 
of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill 
the professional role of attorney. The same is true of abuse of positions of private 
trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director 
or manager of a corporation or other organization. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 
 
  

